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In 1974, the French philosopher of science Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987) published 
a book entitled The Gnosis of Princeton: Scientists in Search of a Religion, which pur-
ported to present the esoteric ideas of an influential but secretive group of sci-
entists working at several prestigious American universities during the 1960s and 
1970s.1 The premise of the book, however, was a deliberate ruse, a fiction. Ruyer 
had invented the subterfuge of an imaginary group of gnostic thinkers working at 
Princeton and elsewhere to present his own ideas and make them accessible to a 
wider public, laying out a new perspective on science and a new articulation of the 
relation between matter and mind. The stratagem turned out to be a consummate 
success: the book became an immediate best-seller, and the French media dubbed 
Ruyer “The Sage of Nancy,” after the city in eastern France where Ruyer had spent 
most of his life.2
If The Gnosis of Princeton gave Ruyer a public acclaim that had hitherto eluded him, 
he had nonetheless already enjoyed a stellar if somewhat idiosyncratic academic 
career. He trained at the prestigious École Normale Supérieure in Paris, and re-
ceived the highest mark in the 1924 agrégation exam in philosophy. Mobilized dur-
ing WWII, he was a prisoner of war at the Oflag XVII-A camp in Germany from 
1940 to 1944, where he wrote his influential book, Elements of Psychobiology.3 In 
1947, he was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nancy, where 
he taught until his retirement in 1972. He declined an offer to move to the Sor-
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bonne, preferring to remain in his beloved Lorraine region, where he maintained 
contacts with numerous scientists. His last book, The Embryogenesis of the World 
and the Silent God, was published posthumously, in 2013.4 In the four decades of 
his active career, Ruyer published over twenty books, and his works had a deci-
sive influence on thinkers as diverse as Georges Canguilhem, Gilbert Simondon, 
and Gilles Deleuze. Throughout, he remained a singular thinker who shunned the 
well-trod currents of twentieth-century French thought such as Bergsonism, phe-
nomenology, existentialism, Marxism, structuralism, even though he remained in 
dialogue with all of them.  
It was no doubt Ruyer’s fierce against-the-grain independence that consigned his 
work to an initial obscurity—despite the success of The Gnosis of Princeton, by the 
end of the century, all his works were out of print. In the past few years, however, 
there has been a strong resurgence of interest in Ruyer’s work. In 2012, Presses 
Universitaires de France (PUF) reissued Ruyer’s 1952 book Néo-Finalisme, consid-
ered by many to be his masterwork. The reissue appeared in PUF’s influential se-
ries MétaphysiqueS, which, significantly, is edited by a new generation of younger 
French philosophers—Élie During, Patrice Maniglier, Quentin Meillassoux, and 
David Rabouin. In 2014, Néo-Finalisme was included in the French agrégation exam 
in philosophy, marking its establishment as a semi-canonical text, and in 2016 the 
University of Minnesota Press published the book in a superb English translation 
by Alyosha Edlebi.5 One of the primary factors motivating this revival, to be sure, 
is the work of the Gilles Deleuze, who was deeply influenced by Ruyer, and made 
frequent reference, in particular, to Neofinalism and The Genesis of Living Forms 
(1958).6 The publication of Edlebi’s translation is thus doubly important, since it 
will not only allow scholars to explore Deleuze’s indebtedness to Ruyer, but will 
hopefully restore Ruyer to his rightful place as one of the most important French 
philosophers of science of the twentieth-century. 
P 
Deleuze always insisted that the power of a philosophy must be measured by the 
concepts it creates, and the new set of divisions these concepts impose on things 
and actions. This is certainly true of Ruyer’s work, and especially Neofinalism. In 
place of the distinction between the organic and the inorganic, Ruyer proposes a 
new distinction that cuts across both these domains: a distinction between abso-
lute forms (individual beings), on the one hand, and molar structures (aggregate or 
mass phenomena), on the other.7 Absolute forms include molecules, viruses, cells, 
118 · daniel w. smith 
embryos, and brains, while molar structures are statistical aggregates of these 
individual forms, such as clouds, gases, crowds, or geological formations. This 
distinction in turn entails a new distribution of the sciences, since the primary 
sciences will be those that deal with absolute forms, while the sciences that only 
study individuals from their molar or statistical side will be relegated to a second-
ary status. 
For Ruyer, like Bergson and Deleuze, the role of philosophy was to create a meta-
physics adequate to contemporary science. Ruyer suggested, however, that there 
are two tendencies that tend to thwart this project: we tend to interpret the na-
ture of physical beings from either visual sensations or human activity (technics) 
(NF 143).  On the one hand, to “observe” a physical object is another way of saying 
that one’s retina (or a photographic plate, or another piece of laboratory equip-
ment) is the locus of the impact of photons emanating from the object. But ob-
servation does not necessarily give us knowledge of the object. Put simply, I can 
observe the circular appearance of a nebula, a rainbow, a solid metallic sphere, a 
soap bubble, or an amoeba at rest, but the internal modes of “bonding” in each of 
these cases is very different. The task of metaphysics is thus “to transform scien-
tific observations into a knowledge of bonds [liaisons]” (224; cf. 104).
On the other hand, and perhaps more insidiously, we tend to interpret nature 
through the prism of our own technical artifacts. Seventeenth-century “mecha-
nism” interpreted nature through a comparison with the “functioning” (147-8) 
of mechanical machines such as watches, levers, or pulleys. Today, many people 
appeal to information machines (computers) as models for the mind: the brain 
is the hardware, and the mind is the software, running different programs in dif-
ferent modules. Genetics, and the discovery of DNA, arose at the same time as 
the computer (both are informational), and, in the popular mind, when one says 
something is “genetic,” they generally mean it is “pre-programmed.” Most egre-
gious, for Ruyer, is the appeal to the “building blocks” or “bricks” of the world 
(141): because we fashion our complex buildings out of simple bricks, we presume 
that the universe, with all its complexity, must likewise be built out of simple 
building blocks, such as atoms or particles—one of the reasons physics is still 
sometimes presented as the most basic of the sciences. “We continue to believe in 
a poorly defined primary of the molecular and the elementary,” with its concomi-
tant presuppositions of reduction and analysis (155).
raymond ruyer, neofinalism · 119 
For Ruyer, this vision of the universe—a multileveled structure in higher levels 
“emerge” from a ground floor (matter, Grund, space-time) that alone is solid—is 
no longer tenable (141). As a way of approaching Ruyer, we might note that De-
leuze, in a seminar on Spinoza, had argued that, in the analysis of matter, there 
are three possibilities for determining what constitutes the “simplest” body: the 
finite, the indefinite, and the actually infinite. The finite approach, which has in-
spired atomism since Epicurus and Lucretius, holds that the analysis of matter 
necessarily reaches a limit, and this limit is the atom or particle (the building 
block). The indefinite approach, by contrast, insists that, no matter how far the 
analysis is pushed, the term one arrives at can always in turn by analyzed and di-
vided—in other words, there is no final or ultimate term (indefinite regress). The 
viewpoint of actual infinity, however, implies a double battle against both the finite 
and the indefinite. Against the indefinite, it insists that there are indeed ultimate 
or final terms that can no longer be divided, but against the finite, it insists that 
these ultimate terms are actually infinite multiplicities that cannot be divided fur-
ther without changing their nature. In other words, one cannot speak in Spinozistic 
terms of a simple body as if it were a brick or a building block; rather, the simplest 
bodies in nature are themselves infinite multiplicities.8
Ruyer adopts a similar position in Neofinalism. The “simplest” terms in Nature, he 
says, are absolute forms, and the concepts he formulates in Neofinalism each indi-
cate an inextricable aspect of such forms. An absolute form is a domain or mul-
tiplicity in constant formation that has an irreducible unity—a “being-together” 
(107)—characterized by a non-dimensional or absolute survey [survol absolu] of 
itself (94), which establishes non-localizable bonds [liaisons] between its constitu-
ent components, with their own zones of overlapping [recouvrement] or indetermi-
nation (108).9 Ruyer distinguishes absolute forms from molar structures, which 
are statistical and secondary composites of these absolute forms. Absolute forms 
include molecules, viruses, embryos, organisms, consciousness, and culture (ex-
ternalized technics and symbolization).  Molar structures include, for instance, 
clouds or gasses, which are composites of individual molecules; sedimentary lime-
stone formations, which are an aggregate of individual mollusks (143), or crowds 
of human beings, which are collections of individual consciousnesses (84). This 
distinction in turn entails a new distribution of the sciences: the primary sciences 
are those that focus on absolute forms, while the secondary sciences are those 
that only study individuals from their molar or statistical side.
P 
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Deleuze called Ruyer “the most recent of Leibniz’s great disciples” because his 
absolute forms are the successors of Leibniz’s monads, though Ruyer conceives 
of them quite differently, and Neofinalism is filled with penetrating analyses of 
different types of absolute forms.10  Consider, for example, a water molecule. It 
is not enough to say that that water “consists” of two hydrogen atoms and one 
oxygen atom, since the molecule is marked by a zone of absolute survey in which 
the internal relations or bonds between the atoms become non-localizable (156), 
and the elements within the system lose their individuality (106). To speak of a 
domain of absolute survey is to speak of a domain of internal bonds.11 “If there were 
no zone of overlapping,” Ruyer writes, “there would be no molecule at all” (108). 
The same is true of atoms, which are no less domains of absolute survey and activ-
ity than more complex molecules. Ruyer notes that quantum physics had already 
replaced the atom of matter with a quantum of action (161). “The old idea was 
that first of all a given piece of matter is what it is, and then, because it enjoys that 
permanent and unchanging nature, it acts on various occasions in various ways.”12 
In the new concept, what an atom is is the same as “doing what it does” (148). In 
Ruyer’s language, an atom is a formation and not a functioning: “an atom is not a 
fully assembled mechanism that functions. It is incessant activity, it is continually 
‘forming itself” in “a certain prolonged rhythm of activities” (147, 149). 
The same is true of even the simplest living being, which “is never ‘fully assem-
bled’; it can never confine itself to functioning, it incessantly ‘forms itself ’” (147). 
Every cell, Ruyer notes, “has to be an absolute form with self-survey to control 
the beginning of its own division, progressively diminishing the unity of the sys-
tem for the benefit of the individuality of its components” (109). One of Ruyer’s 
recurrent examples on this score are unicellular animals such as the amoeba. An 
amoeba digests food, even though it does not have a digestive tract; it reacts to 
its environment, even though it does not have sense organs or a nervous system. 
Lacking such organs, the amoeba is nonetheless capable of “unified” behavior—
self-direction, conditioned reflexes, habits, learning, adaptation, instinctive hab-
its, and so on.13 One could say that the amoeba has its own subjectivity, a “primary 
psychism,” which is another way of saying that it is a form-in-itself.14
When Ruyer considers the relation between molecules and cells (or between the 
inorganic and the organic, in the usual parlance), he writes: “The emergence of 
life, considered as an absolutely novel mode of being, is no longer a philosophical 
problem. There is no longer any reason to believe that from a chemical molecule 
to a bacillus, the abyss is greater than from a bacillus to a vertebrate” (154).  Writ-
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ing in the 1950s, Ruyer observes that numerous physicists—Bohr, Jordan, de Bro-
glie, Schrödinger—had already had their say on the problem of life, even though 
Ruyer remained critical of certain works in this genre such as Schrödinger’s clas-
sic What is Life?.15 Nonetheless, Ruyer notes that Schrödinger’s theory of a gener-
alized molecule is not that different from Whitehead’s seemingly opposite theory 
of a generalized organism, since both insisted on lines of continuity between in-
dividual forms (156). To affirm that microorganisms are molecules is to affirm, 
at the same time, that molecules are microorganisms—or rather, that both are 
absolute forms. 
P 
But perhaps the most probing analysis Ruyer provides in Neofinalism is found in 
the chapter entitled “The Brain and the Embryo” (45-67), in part because Ruyer’s 
analysis approaches these two domains of absolute survey through the somewhat 
unusual prism of technology. It has often been argued—by Leroi-Gourhan, for ex-
ample (20-21)—that technical objects are “prosthetic,” that is, they are exten-
sions of the body or “externalizations” of the organs. A hammer externalizes the 
forearm and fist in wood and iron; clothing externalizes the skin; a baby’s bottle 
externalizes the mother’s breast; a kitchen stove externalizes the stomach; and 
so on. The evolutionary conditions that made such externalizations possible are 
tied to the morphology of the human body. In assuming an upright position (bi-
pedalism), two of our own organs became “deterritorialized,” to use Deleuze’s 
language. Our front paws lost their faculty of locomotion and became hands, 
which are prehensive, and capable of doing many more things than simply walk-
ing (grasping, pounding, rotating, etc.). At the same time, the mouth lost its own 
capacity for prehension, which was taken over by the hand, but in the process it 
gained the capacity for speech. In other words, when the hand and the mouth were 
de-territorialized, they were simultaneously re-territorialized on new actions, pri-
marily language (for the mouth) and tool-making (for the hand). It is not simply 
our large brains that give humans their specificity, since our brains would have 
had far less to do if our bodies did not have a mouth that speaks or hands that 
fabricate. 
It is true that other animal species produced externalized technologies—spiders 
weave webs, beavers build dams, birds construct nests—but their technical activ-
ity seems to be directly derived from their genetic makeup as a kind of “extended 
phenotype.”16 What seems specific to the human species, by contrast, is that its 
externalized organs become detachable, removeable, separated from the body, to 
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the point where they enter their own evolutionary history. In a sense, evolution 
bifurcates: the human organism has been sculpted over thousands of years by 
an extremely slow-moving evolution, but these organisms in turn have produced 
externalized artifacts that connect together to create a new technological body, 
which is evolving at a faster and increasingly accelerated pace. But Ruyer devel-
ops this thesis in a new direction. In so-called higher animals, “functions” like 
digestion and thought become localized in specific organs such as the stomach 
and the brain, but clearly—as the example of the amoeba shows—the functions 
do not require the specialized organs.17 Ruyer drew the obvious conclusion: bodily 
organs are themselves technical artifacts; they are specialized “tools” that have been 
fabricated by the organism over the course of evolution. Ruyer thus distinguishes 
three levels of technicity: bodily organs as an originary technicity; externalized 
organs as an extended phenotype (webs, dams, nests); and the detachable arti-
facts that enter into a circuit external to the body. “Organic formation, instinctive 
external circuit, and intelligent external circuit” (33; cf. 20). 
The consequences Ruyer draws from this analysis are immense. Most obviously, 
it explains the title of Neofinalism. Ruyer is not a traditional “finalist,” presum-
ing a teleology or purpose throughout nature or for nature as a whole. Rather, 
he defends a “neofinalism” that begins, uncontroversially, with the presumption 
that humans act in a purposeful manner when they fabricate technical artifacts: 
we have a finalist aim in fabricating cooking utensils, which depend on mnemic 
themes or senses that exist in a “transspatial” dimension (126-33). But here again, 
Ruyer draws the inevitable conclusions: what is true for intelligent behavior must 
be equally true of instinctive behavior.  “It is impossible to recognize a finalist 
sense in the invention of cooking utensils and to deny it to the organs of inges-
tion, digestion, and assimilation” (19). In other words, neither consciousness, nor 
the brain, nor the nervous system has a monopoly over memory, habit, invention 
or signifying activity in general (37). Consider the fact that humans are currently 
attempting to fabricate an artificial brain or an artificial intelligence whose capac-
ities may soon exceed those of human intelligence (the so-called “singularity”).18 
Yet every human embryo already knows how to fabricate a human brain, as well 
as a stomach, lungs, kidneys, and a circulatory system. In epistemological terms, 
one could say that an embryo has a knowledge that exceeds that of the brain—a 
brain, moreover, that the embryo itself has created. If Ruyer sometimes calls the 
embryo our “primary organic consciousness” (38, 43-44, 72, 74, 100), it is because 
the creation of the body and its organs is the neo-finalist activity of the embryo, 
just as the creation of technical artifacts is the neo-finalist creation of the brain, 
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our “secondary consciousness” (73-4, 94, 98-99, 215). The equipotentiality of the 
embryo is prolonged in the plasticity of the brain.
But this is another way of saying that the embryo and consciousness, like mol-
ecules and cells, are absolute forms, with all their attendant characteristics: ab-
solute survey, non-localizable bonds, zones of indetermination. It was in his first 
book, Consciousness and the Body (1937), that Ruyer began to analyze consciousness 
as a form-in-itself, and these analyses reach their culmination in the ninth chap-
ter of Neofinalism on “Absolute Domains of Survey” (90-103), which is no doubt 
the crucial chapter of the book. Ruyer shows that my visual field is “surveyed” by 
consciousness without ever having to position itself at a distance from it (97). In 
other words, the details of perception are not linked to each other through causal 
links, like the parts of a machine, but are grasped in the immediacy of an abso-
lute time-survey and space-survey, independent of any supplementary dimension 
(100). Philosophy has often considered consciousness to be knowledge, but for 
Ruyer, consciousness is primarily a domain of absolute survey and nonlocalizable 
bonds (107). It is the concept of absolute survey, Ruyer claims, that holds “the key 
not only to the problem of consciousness but also to the problem of life” (94). It 
is not an exaggeration to say that the pages where Ruyer develops his concept of 
absolute survey are among the most original passages in twentieth-century phi-
losophy, and they merit close study. Nor is it by chance that Deleuze and Guattari, 
in What is Philosophy? (1991), presented philosophical concepts as absolute forms 
in the Ruyerian sense, thereby adding concepts to the continuity of individualities 
that populate the universe.19
P
It would be tempting to characterize the metaphysics that Ruyer develops in Neo-
finalism as pan-psychist (everything is consciousness) or pan-vitalist (everything 
is life). Ruyer himself sometimes has recourse to such language, as when he calls 
the embryo, for instance, a primary consciousness. In making such links, Ruyer 
would certainly be in good company, since others have taken the organism or life 
as a model for metaphysics. Whitehead, who exerted a strong influence on Ruyer 
(second only, perhaps, to Samuel Butler) called his process philosophy a “philoso-
phy of the organism,” and Deleuze appropriated the tradition of vitalism when he 
spoke of “non-organic life.” But such characterizations miss the true radicality 
of Ruyer’s thought. “It would be obviously absurd,” he insists, “to imagine that 
a molecule’s mode of unity is the same as an organism’s.”20 The differences be-
tween the two are manifest, and Ruyer’s deeper claim is that they both share in 
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a common problem: “the primary mystery of the form-in-itself” (110). They are 
both individualities or forms that persist and reconstitute themselves in a self-
forming activity. The point of Ruyer’s philosophy, as he himself says, “is not to 
define the atom, the molecule, and the physical individuality as organisms or as 
psychological consciousnesses, but instead to see what is schematically common 
to the molecule, the organism, and consciousness. In all these cases, the common 
schema is a domain of absolute survey and activity” (162). Ruyer’s work thus im-
plies an entirely new philosophy of nature, which in turn implies a reconception 
of the role of the various sciences in exploring nature. 
Most generally, it does away with an obsolete vision of science, inspired by Au-
guste Compte, which presumed a hierarchy among the various sciences, with 
physics as the base, followed by chemistry, biology, and the human sciences. Al-
ready in his early work, Elements of Psychobiology (1947), Ruyer demonstrated that 
what the sciences show us are not levels, but rather lines of continuity between 
absolute forms or individuals.21 In Neofinalism, Ruyer calls this a “fibrous” concep-
tion of the universe (140-153) that follows the lines of continuity between mole-
cules, viruses, organisms, and consciousnesses.22 The fibrous universe envisioned 
by Ruyer poses a fundamentally new problem for the sciences, namely, how to dif-
ferentiate between absolute forms along these line of continuity. Ruyer gives pass-
ing hints on how he might have pursued this still-nascent project in Neofinalism, 
which revolves around that status of memory. “The main difference, no doubt, be-
tween physical beings and the most complex organisms does not derive from the 
instantaneity or the absence of memory in the form, but from a lack of detachment 
of this memory” (149). It has often been noted that, for the human species, the in-
vention of the technology of writing was an externalization of memory: informa-
tion could be henceforth stored in documents (and, now, computer files) rather 
than being retained in the brain.23 Likewise, in supposedly lesser organisms, “or-
ganic memory [genetics] constitutes specific potentials that can be reincarnated 
in innumerable individuals” (149), even in the self-replicating reproduction of vi-
ruses. What seems unique about physical individualities, by contrast, is that this 
semi-substantialization of activity into memory does not take place: atoms are 
“uninterrupted activity” that “lack a detachable memory” (151-2). Indeed, “they 
have no need for one, because they never have to take up again the thread of their 
uninterrupted activity” (152). This theme of the detachment of memory, as a crite-
rion for differentiating among absolute forms, is an ongoing project that Ruyer 
has bequeathed to subsequent thinkers. 
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More specifically, as we have seen, Ruyer’s work implies a new distribution of the 
diverse sciences based on the distinction between the molecular and the molar. 
For Ruyer, the fibrous line of continuity that links atoms, viruses, embryos, and 
brains is entirely “molecular” (Ruyer, to be sure, is giving this term a new con-
cept), to the point where he can say that an elephant is a molecular, micro-scopic 
being, far more so than, say, a soap bubble (106). Much traditional science deals 
with the secondary and statistical molar relations between absolute forms. If we 
watched, from the air, a massive crowd of human beings moving through a city 
during a demonstration, negotiating their trajectory through streets and around 
obstacles, their motion would be entirely explainable by the laws of fluid dynam-
ics, but these molar and statistical properties of the crowd would say nothing 
about the individual subjects, which are absolute forms capable of equipotential-
ity. Similarly, a sedimentary limestone strata can be described entirely in terms of 
its deterministic physical and geological properties, but nonetheless it cannot be 
confused with the individual mollusks of which it is made up (143). The mistake 
of many traditional sciences is that “they went illegitimately from ‘molar’ and sta-
tistical properties to individual properties” (143). The innovation of Ruyer’s work 
in the philosophy of science will be to have shown the priority of the sciences that 
follow the fibrous lines of continuity between absolute forms, such as quantum 
physics (for molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic realities), biology and embryology 
(for uni- and multi-cellular beings), psychology (for consciousness) and sociol-
ogy (for culture). The secondary sciences, some of which have hitherto been the 
privileged sciences, are those that only study individuals from their molar or sta-
tistical side, such as classical physics (e.g., thermodynamics), physico-chemical 
physiology, neuro-psychology, population biology (the mathematical study of the 
struggle for life) and classical political economics (crowd phenomena). 
If Ruyer’s philosophy ultimately cannot be characterized pan-psychist or pan-
vitalist or even pan-physicalist, it is because the matter-life-consciousness hier-
archy on which these characterizations are based on what might be said to con-
stitute a “folk metaphysics” that is no longer supported by science itself. Neither 
matter, nor life, nor consciousness can be reduced to the other; all are absolute 
forms, at once spatiotemporal and transspatiotemporal (249). The fundamental 
line of demarcation in nature can no longer be drawn between the organic and 
the inorganic, or between mind and body, but must be relocated in the distinction 
between absolute forms, as unitary domains of action, and the molar aggregates 
into which they enter. These domains of absolute survey implicate “a metaphysical 
‘dimension’” of transspatial mnemic themes that is “altogether different from the 
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geometric dimensions of space-time” (249), and it is the development of this new 
metaphysics that is Ruyer’s fundamental contribution to philosophy. Despite hav-
ing been written more than sixty-five years ago, Neofinalism retains an extraordi-
nary topicality and immediacy that makes it, even now, an essential contribution 
to the concerns of contemporary philosophy.
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